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STUDENT NOTES
THE UNAUTHOmZED PACrIcE OF LAw
"The practice of law does not lend itself to a precise and all
inclusive definition."' The truth of this statement has long been
recognized and has been generally affirmed in court opinions.2 But,
despite the difficulty, there are occasions when courts must attempt
to define the practice of law or to apply prior definitions to existing
cases.
The first problem encountered in attempting to determine just
what the practice of law constitutes, concerns authority. To be more
precise: Who has the authority to define the practice of law and who
has the authority to prevent unlawful practice? Many state court
decisions are found that base such authority on an inherent power
of the courts stemming from a constitutional creation of a judicial
branch of government.3
1 Dagan v. Berman, 14 N.J. 467, 102 A.2d 765 (1954).
2 lRhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179
Atl. 139 (1935).
a Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408
(1954); In re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954); In re McBride,
164 Ohio St. 419, 132 N.E.2d 118 (1956).
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This search for authority is not a difficult one in West Virginia.
The West Virginia Constitution4 provides that "the judicial power
of the State shall be vested in a supreme court of appeals, in circuit
courts and the judges thereof, and in such inferior tribunals as are
herein authorized and in justices of the peace." The constitution 5
also states that "The Legislative, Executive and Judicial Depart-
ments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise
the powers properly belonging to either of the others... These
two provisions of the West Virginia Constitution would make a
good argument in favor of the inherent power theory, but a West
Virginia statutes further removes doubt. "The supreme court of
appeals of West Virginia shall, from time to time, prescribe, adopt,
and amend rules: (a) Defining the practice of law.. .. "
Under this authority the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in 1947 promulgated a definition of the practice of law.
7 It
is a broad definition, making no attempt to cover in any detail all of
the various fact situations which arise in determining when a person
is or is not practicing law. However, it does set out three general
services that do constitute the practice of law. Paraphrasing, they
are: 1. Advice involving the application of legal principles to facts,
purposes or desires; 2. Preparation of legal instruments of any
character; and 3. Representing the interest of another before any
tribunal-judicial, administrative or executive-otherwise than in
the presentation of facts, or factual conclusions, as distinguished
from legal conclusions in respect to such facts and figures.
The next logical question is how may the courts use and imple-
ment this authority. In West Virginia there is definite statutory
authority8 for the supreme court to create a West Virginia State
Bar, with membership mandatory for all persons practicing law in
the state. One of the purposes of the State Bar mentioned in the
statute is to enforce "such rules as may be prescribed, adopted and
promulgated by the court from time to time under this section."
Article VIII, § 1 of the By-Laws of the West Virginia State Bar
provides: "The Committee on Unlawful Practice shall have juris-
diction over all matters and questions which may be considered as
constituting the mlawful practice of law under the definition of
4 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
5 W. VA. CONST. art V, § 1.
8W. VA. CODE ch. 51, art. 1, § 4A (Michie 1955).
7W. VA. Sup. CT. Rumxs, 128 W. Va. XIX (1947).
8 W. VA. CODE ch. 51, art. 1, § 4A (Michie 1955).
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the practice of law adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia .. " Other sections of this article go into detail
as to the powers of the committee to investigate any unauthorized
practice of law, to dismiss any complaint, to subpoena witnesses,
and to institute proper proceedings to prevent such unauthorized
practice.
The practice of law by laymen appears to occur most often
in three areas within the legal field. The remainder of this paper
will be devoted to a discussion of the problems encountered within
each of the three areas. Where applicable, reference will be made
to the West Virginia definition of the practice of law and its
employment in solving the problems here involved.
1. Appearance Before an Administrative Agency or Tribunal
A. recent West Virginia case9 is directly and immediately in
point on this subject. A proceeding in equity was brought by the
West Virginia State Bar to enjoin a layman from representing claim-
ants before the State Compensation Commissioner. The rules of the
commission permitted such action on the part of the layman. 10 The
supreme court held that it is the character of the act, and not the
place where it is performed, that is the decisive factor in determin-
ing whether the act constitutes the practice of law, and that in this
case the layman was practicing law. The definition adopted by the
West Virginia Supreme Court, prohibiting the representation of
"the interests of another before any tribunal-judicial, administra-
tive, or executive- ... ." would seem clearly to prohibit the activity
in this case.
As to the rules of the commissioner, the court said: "The State
Compensation Commissioner, as an administrative agency or tri-
bunal, is without authority, by rule or otherwise, to permit an agent
who is not a duly licensed attorney to practice before him, and a
provision of any such rule which attempts to permit an agent who
is not a duly licensed attorney to practice before the commissioner
is void and of no force or effect."
Another question that arises in this area, as well as the other
areas to be discussed later in this paper, is whether the practice of
law is a constitutional right. On this point the Early case, supra, has
a direct holding. "Though the right to practice law is not a natural
W est Virginia State Bar v. Early, 109 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1959).
10 Rule 21, Rules and Regulations of the Workmen's Compensation Com-
missioner (1949).
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or constitutional right or an absolute or de jure right, it is a valuable
special privilege in the nature of a franchise which may be protected
by injunction against invasion." In support of this view the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that the question of whether
women shall be admitted to practice under provisions of the Virginia
Code is for the determination of the Virginia courts alone, for the
right to practice law in state courts, is not such a privilege or
immunity of a citizen of the United States as is guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment." This view also has a great deal of sup-
port in the state courts,12 and no case has been found contra.
The situation is clouded, however, by a 1957 United States
Supreme Court decision.13 The Board of Bar Examiners of New
Mexico denied petitioner a license to practice law in New Mexico
on grounds of poor moral character, as shown by past Communist
associations, past arrests and the use of aliases. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, stating that "A State cannot exclude a
person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a
manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal
Protestation Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court
went on to say that "A State can require high standards of qualifi-
cation, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before
it admits an applicant to the bar, but any quelification must have
a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law."
Thus there are cases holding the practice of law not to be a
constitutional right, and this Schware case holds that a person cannot
be deprived of the right to practice law in contravention of the
constitutional provisions. While there may seem to be some diffi-
culty in reconciling these cases, a controlling factor may be found in
the fact that in the first cases cited there were no educational quali-
fications, while in the latter case petitioner was educationally quali-
fied.
As a sidelight, the West Virginia case first discussed in this
area has caused two interesting developments. The Worknen's
11In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall
180 (1878); Philbrook v. Newman, 85 Fed 189 (N.D. Cal. 1898).
12 State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N.W.2d 802 (1942);
Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E.2d 90 (1954); Richmond Assn of
Credit Men Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 158 (1987); In re
Adkins, 88 W. Va. 678, 98 S.E. 888 (1919).
13 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 858 U.S. 282 (1957).
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Compensation Commissioner, on July 8, 1959, promulgated an
amended rule 2114 which, recognizing the court's decision, provides
in effect that, in hearings before the commissioner, a claimant or
employer must appear either in person or by an attorney duly
licensed and admitted to practice law in the courts of this state. The
case also had later repercussions. A special committee has been
named by the Board of Governors of The West Virginia State Bar
to consider possible revision of the supreme court definition of the
practice of law.1
5
2. Real Estate Brokers and Legal Instruments
A. pre-trial stipulation in a 1959 Arkansas case 16 stated that
"The practice of completing printed forms of instruments incidental
to the completion of real estate transactions in which a real estate
broker has an interest as broker has been widespread and prevalent
in the State of Arkansas for a number of years and is in practice
now and the said real estate brokers intend to continue said practice
in the future." The brokers were in the habit of filling in forms for
these instruments incident to transactions in which they were in-
volved as brokers. The instruments included deeds, options, mort-
gages, leases, and many others of this general nature. The Arkansas
court held that these acts constituted the practice of law and stated
that "It is obvious therefore that the practice of law is not confined
to services by a licensed attorney in a court of justice, but also
includes any services of a legal nature rendered outside of courts
and unrelated to matters pending in the courts."
Another stipulation in this case presents an additional related
problem: "The forms used by the defendants have been previously
approved by attorneys. . . ." As to the propriety of attorneys
engaging in activities of this sort, the American Bar Association
Cannons of Ethics17 seem to be clear: "No lawyer shall permit his
professional services, or his name, to be used in aid of, or to make
possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay agency, per-
sonal or corporate."
The present definition of the practice of law in West Virginia
includes the preparation "for another legal instruments of any
14 1 W. Va. State Bar News 499 (1959).
15 1 W. Va. State Bar News 521 (1959).
16 Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912 (Ark. 1959).
17 Canon 47, Amer. Bar Ass'n Canons of Professional Ethics, American
Bar Ass'n Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances
(1947).
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character," and so would seem to limit the activities in the principal
case to the legal profession.
3. Accountants and Tax Law
This is perhaps the most difficult area of all, since there is
obviously a close connection between the law and accounting in
the tax field. The problem has been recognized in a New York case,18
where it was stated that there is an "overlapping of law and account-
ing. An accountant must be familiar to a considerable extent with
tax law and must employ his knowledge of the law in his accounting
practice. By the same token, a tax lawyer must have an under-
standing of accounting. It is difficult, therefore, to draw a precise
line in the tax area between the field of the accountant and the
field of the lawyer." This case dealt with the problem of past
municipal taxes owed, and in what year they could properly be
deducted from the Federal Income Tax. Advice on the question
was sought from, and given by, an accountant. The accountant had
not prepared the income tax returns for the company, and it is on
this point that the court apparently based its decision. Using the "in-
cidental" test, the court held that if an accountant sets up or audits
books, or advises with respect to the keeping of books and records,
the making of entries therein and the handling of transactions for
tax purposes and the preparation of tax returns, his work and advice
must take cognizance of the law, and conform with the law, par-
ticularly the tax law. This would be permitted because the appli-
cation of legal knowledge in such work is only "incidental" to the
accounting functions. It would not be permitted for the accountant,
despite his knowledge or use of the law, to give legal advice which
is unconnected with accounting work.
In a later California case19 the court went further than this and
repudiated the "incidental" test. Here an accountant prepared
Federal Income Tax returns, one of which contained an "application
for a tentative carry-back adjustment." The court quoted a definition
of the practice of law previously set down by the California Supreme
Court in an earlier case:2 0 "As the term is generally understood,
the practice of the law is the doing and performing services in a
court of justice, in any matter depending therein, throughout its
1In re Bercu, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948).
19 Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App.2d supp. 807, 273 P.2d 619 (1954).
20 People ex rel. Lawyer's Institute v. Merchant's Protective Corp., 189
Cal. 581, 209 Pac. 863 (1922).
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [1960], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss3/5
